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I 
THE ISSUE RAISED BY THE CERTIFICATION ORDER IS WHETHER 
THERE ARE SEPARATE STANDARDS FOR WAIVER BY 
SILENCE AND WAIVER BY ACTION, NOT 
WHETHER THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO FIND THAT 
DESERET FEDERAL WAIVED THE COMPLETION DATE, 
A. United Pacific and Tri-K Have Inappropriately Responded to 
the Certification Order as Though It Were an Opportunity to 
Appeal the Judgment, 
Two parties have filed blue covered briefs - United 
Pacific Insurance Company ("United Pacific") and Tri-K Contrac-
tors ("Tri-K").- This reply brief will respond to both of their 
opening briefs. 
Judge Jenkins has asked for a clarification on the 
standard under Utah law for proving waiver. He has asked specif-
ically whether a different standard applies depending on whether 
waiver is alleged from a party's action or conduct, or a party's 
inaction or silence. Instead of properly focusing on these ques-
tions, United Pacific and Tri-K have argued at great length that 
there was ample evidence that Deseret Federal had waived Tri-Kfs 
completion date for building the condominium project. Tri-K even 
asked for the Court to find error on the part of the trial court. 
1/ Because these questions of law were certified by the Chief 
Judge of the United States District Court, sua sponte, nei-
ther party is the appellant as such. Rather, they are in 
the position of cross-petitioners, each entitled to file 
reply briefs and to reserve time for rebuttal at oral argu-
ment. Letter from Geoffrey Butler dated April 27, 1992. 
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These arguments should be reserved for the United States District 
Court and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. They serve no pur-
pose here. The focus here should be limited to the narrow issues 
of law raised by the certification order. 
B. While They Claim to be in Agreement, United Pacific and 
Tri-K Have Taken Contrary Positions on Hunter v. Hunter and 
its Three Prong Standard for Waiver, 
Tri-K states in its opening brief at 15 that it joins 
in the argument of United Pacific which it claims extensively 
reviewed the Utah case law on waiver and the standards applicable 
to determine waiver. Yet, Tri-K argues in its two pages of anal-
ysis that the standard for proving waiver as outlined in Hunter 
v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430 (Utah 1983), has been overruled by Morgan 
v. Quailbrook, 704 P.2d 573 (Utah 1985), and Parks v. Zions First 
National Bank, 673 P.2d 590 (Utah 1983).-/ See Tri-K Brief at 
16-17. While this is consistent with the initial position taken 
by United Pacific in the trial court, it is very different than 
3/ United Pacific's current analysis of the case law.— 
1' This point is hardly worth addressing. Morgan v. 
Quailbrook. 704 P.2d at 578, cites Hunter with approval. 
2/ In support of its post trial motions, United Pacific vehe-
mently contended that Hunter had been overruled even though 
it argues now that Hunter sets forth the correct principles 
to make a factual finding where the relinquishment of a 
known right occurs as a result of a party's silence. See 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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United Pacific's response to the certified questions of 
law was that the "inconsistent with any other intent" prong has 
been applied only in those cases involving waiver by silence, 
hence, under Utah law there is a separate standard for waiver by 
4/ 
silence.-
United Pacific tried to find a different standard of 
proof where the expression is silence rather than words so that 
it could peg the present case as one which only requires proof 
that Deseret Federal's conduct was distinct and unequivocal, but 
not necessarily inconsistent with any other intent. In order to 
force this result, United Pacific inaccurately portrayed the 
facts in the waiver decisions of this Court. 
As the RTC has explained in its opening brief, a dis-
tinction between the proof necessary for implied waiver by 
silence versus implied waiver by action is improper. As this 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities submitted by United 
Pacific in support of its Motion for Post Trial Relief at 
15. United Pacific initially filed this Memorandum with the 
Third District Court, and then re-filed it with the federal 
court, Docket No. 63. 
4/ United Pacific referred to the waiving party's intent as 
being distinct, unequivocal and inconsistent with any other 
intent. It is, however, the conduct evincing that intent 
which must be inconsistent with any other interest. Hunter 
v. Hunter, 669 P.2d at 432; Wagner v. Wagner, 621 P.2d 1279 
(Wash. 1980). 
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constituting waiver did not mean that the alleged waiver was 
based on Mrs, Hunter's silence. It merely meant that Mr. Hunter 
was unable to prove his case. 
Having distinguished Hunter as a case involving waiver 
by silence, United Pacific then forced the subsequent case law 
into either a silence or action classification based on the defi-
nition of waiver recited in the opinion, regardless of whether 
the facts actually justified the classification. 
United Pacific also mischaracterized Anqelos v. First 
Interstate Bank, 671 P.2d 772 (Utah 1983), as a silence or inac-
tion case because the court used the Hunter language and held 
that any action or conduct constituting waiver was missing. Cer-
tainly the absence of conduct which expresses an intent to relin-
quish a known right does not mean a fortiori that the waiver must 
be found in a parties' inaction. Anqelos was an implied, rather 
than express, waiver case, but it was not a waiver by silence 
case. Once again, this Court stated: "To constitute waiver, 
one's actions or conduct must be distinctly made, must evince in 
some unequivocal manner an intent to waive, and must be inconsis-
tent with any other intent." (Emphasis added.) 671 P.2d at 776. 
United Pacific analyzed Parks v. Zions First National 
Bank, 673 P.2d 590 (Utah 1983), as a case of waiver by action 
ostensibly because it lacked the three part (distinct, 
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shares a different view. The Court defined waiver as the inten-
tional relinquishment of a known right and then added, "Mere 
silence is not a waiver unless there is some duty or obligation 
to speak" [citing Dalton v. LeBlanc, 350 F.2d 95, 98-99 (10th 
Cir. 1965)]. 802 P.2d at 730. 
United Pacific also mischaracterized Rees v. 
Intermountain Health Care, 808 P.2d 1074 (Utah 1991), as support-
ing its thesis that waiver by silence requires different proof 
than waiver by action. Dr. Rees had submitted jury instructions 
based on the language in Clark v. American Concept Ins. Co.y 758 
P.2d 470, 473 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), and B. R. Woodward Marketing 
Inc. v. Collins Food Service, Inc., 754 P.2d 99, 101 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). In the latter case, the Court of Appeals stated that 
the pivotal issue was whether Woodward intended to relinquish his 
rights or, more precisely, whether Woodward's conduct unequivo-
cally evinced an intent to waive or at least was inconsistent 
with any other intent. Id. at 102. B. R. Woodward and the case 
upon which it relied appear to have been based on the incorrect 
rationale that the waiving party1s subjective intent for the 
relinquishment is largely irrelevant.- The Court of Appeals 
held that whether waiver will be found in any particular case 
£/ See Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
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As the RTC has pointed out . . .-i
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to waive a right can be constructive, rather than actual 
where the conduct which implies a waiver is of such a nature 
as to mislead the opposi*.- ; a: - . :: r an icnest belief that 
the waiver was intended cr asser*ed *o. This conduct must 
at least be inconsistent wit*-, any otner intent, 32 C.J.S. 
at 1060. This threshold requirement was not me- -.ere where 
the jury answered "no" * irre;. i interrogatory '-. 
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instructions. Intermountain Health Care conceded in its appel-
lant's brief that express waiver requires evidence of conduct 
which is distinct, unequivocal and inconsistent with any other 
intent (the language used in jury instruction No. 10, the waiver 
8/ by silence instruction).- In view of this concession, the Court 
held that silence requires an identical standard. Rees, 808 P.2d 
at 1075. Rees does not stand for the proposition that a differ-
ent standard of proof applies to cases involving waiver by 
silence. It supports the notion that implied waiver, whether by 
action or silence, requires proof that the conduct was distinct, 
unequivocal and inconsistent with any other intent. 
The RTC submits that the standard of proof for implied 
waiver by silence is no different than the standard of proof for 
implied waiver by words or action. This position is entirely 
consistent with the case law and the underlying principle that 
the intention of the party holding a right that has supposedly 
been relinquished is crucial. By definition, waiver is the 
intentional relinquishment of a known right. There is no waiver 
unless the waiver is so intended by one party and so understood 
and accepted by the other. 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver, 
It would have been more accurate for Intermountain Health 
Care to concede that waiver which is implied from words and 
action requires certain proof without referring to express 
waiver which was not an issue. 
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S 158 at 843. Whether the relinquishment is by affirmative con-
duct or by silence, it must be inconsistent with any other 
intent. 
II 
WHEN THE COURT ADDRESSES THE THIRD QUESTION 
CERTIFIED BY JUDGE JENKINS, THE FOCUS SHOULD BE 
ON SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES NOS. 22-24 AND 
WHETHER THEY PROPERLY STATED THE LAW. 
United Pacific and Tri-K made reference to an excessive 
number of special interrogatories attempting to demonstrate that 
Deseret Federal did waive its rights to have Tri-K complete the 
project by December 31, 1984. In doing so, they confused the 
contractual relationships between the parties. It is important 
to understand that there were two contracts at issue when this 
case went to trial. The first was a Construction Loan Agreement 
between Soters, Inc., and Deseret Federal. Trial Exhibit 1. 
Tri-K was never a party to this contract. Under this agreement, 
entered into as of April 4, 1984, Soters and Deseret Federal 
agreed that the project would be completed by April 4, 1985, and 
that Soters would re-pay its construction loan on that date. As 
that date approached, with the loan out of balance and the 
project far from completion, Deseret Federal, hopeful that Soters 
would bring the loan back into balance and that Tri-K would com-
plete the project, agreed to extend the re-payment date from 
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April 4, 1985 to October 5, 1985, as it was permitted to do under 
paragraph 4.3 of the Construction Loan Agreement. This conces-
sion to Soters had nothing to do with Tri-K. 
After being instructed, the jury was presented with 52 
special interrogatories. Of these interrogatories, Nos. 6-8, 
patterned after jury instruction No. 18 and the three part stan-
dard for waiver in Hunter v. Hunter, asked whether Soters had 
proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Deseret Federal 
had waived the completion date which bound Soters, Inc., under 
the Construction Loan Agreement. This issue was critical to a 
determination as to whether Deseret Federal had cause to cease 
funding the loan. The jury answered that there had been a waiver 
of Soters1 completion date by answering yes, that the evidence of 
the intent to relinquish a known right was distinct (interroga-
tory No. 6), unequivocal (interrogatory No. 7), and inconsistent 
with any other intent (interrogatory No. 8). The jury ultimately 
found Soters in breach of the Construction Loan Agreement for 
other reasons. See Findings of Fact, No. 47 at 12. Special 
interrogatories Nos. 6-8, the Construction Loan Agreement, and 
any other issues between Soters, Inc. and Deseret Federal have 
been resolved by a post trial settlement agreement and have noth-
ing to do with United Pacific or Tri-K. They are clearly not the 
focus of the certification order. See Certification Order at 8. 
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The second agreement at issue during the trial was an 
AIA Standard Form Construction Contract entered into between 
Soters, Inc., and Tri-K. Trial Exhibit 4001. Soters assigned 
this contract, with Tri-K's express consent, to Deseret Federal 
as additional security for the loan. When Deseret Federal 
entered the picture in April 1984, construction of the Camelot 
condominiums was well under way funded by Zions Bank. Knudsen 
had been a maker of the initial promissory note to Zions Bank and 
was involved in the project for a piece of the action. Testimony 
of Sherwin Knudsen, RT. 57:21-59:5, 159:4-23, 5/13/88; Trial 
Exhibit No. 60; Testimony of Stanley Stoll, RT. 190:12-14, 
5/12/88. Before Deseret Federal would fund the construction 
loan, it insisted on a typed construction contract between Soters 
and Tri-K. Sherwin Knudsen had attorney Stanley Stoll prepare 
the document. When they got to the section where a completion 
date needed to be filled in Stoll asked Knudsen what date Knudsen 
felt comfortable with. Knudsen specified December 31, 1984. 
After questioning Knudsen to make sure he could complete by that 
date, Stoll entered the date in the blank provided. Testimony of 
Stanley Stoll RT. 157:20-158:10, 5/12/88. There were several 
prior handwritten versions of this construction contract that 
specified a completion date of "in a timely manner." The jury 
determined that Trial Exhibit 4001, the typed version of the 
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agreement prepared by Stoll, dated April 15, 1984, with a stated 
project completion date of December 31, 1984, was the binding 
operative contract. See jury's answer to special interrogatory 
No. 18 included in Tab 6 to United Pacific's bound addendum. 
This construction agreement was the document that bound 
Tri-K to substantially complete by December 31, 1984. This date 
chosen by Tri-K was unrelated to the obligation of Soters Inc. to 
complete the project by April 4, 1985. It is the breach of this 
construction agreement that triggered United Pacific's duties 
under its performance bond. 
Special interrogatory Nos. 22-24 related to Tri-K's 
performance of its construction agreement and asked the jury to 
decide if Deseret Federal had waived its right to demand timely 
completion of the project. Special interrogatories 48-50 
addressed the identical issue, but with respect to United Pacif-
ic's obligation based on Tri-K's breach. 
Interrogatory Nos. 22-24 and 48-50 were not identical, 
although they should have been. Counsel for Deseret Federal 
properly objected specifically to No. 50 because it was not 
framed in the same terms as No. 24 and was simply a reiteration 
-13-
of the principles questioned in Nos. 48 and 49.- Moreover, Nos. 
48-50 did not comport with jury instruction No. 18 as did Nos. 
22-24. Judge Baldwin recognized this fact after the special 
interrogatories had been answered and concluded that Nos. 48-50 
should have been worded the same as Nos. 22-24, and that had Nos. 
48-50 conformed to Nos. 22-24, the jury's answers to Nos. 48-50 
would have been the same as their answers to Nos. 22-24.— 
United Pacific's ultimate objection throughout its post-trial 
motions and argument before Judge Jenkins has been that No. 24 is 
z/ "With respect to Interrogatories 48, 49 and 50, Deseret Fed-
eral objects on several bases: One, that those interrogato-
ries are duplicitous of other interrogatories dealing with 
Sherwin Knudsen earlier, and those issues were covered ear-
lier and need not be covered here. And in addition, Deseret 
Federal objects to Interrogatory No. 50 because it does not 
set out the correct elements of waiver, particularly the 
element that a waiver must not be inconsistent with any 
other intent." (RT, Objections to Jury Interrogatories and 
Special Verdict, 27:6-15, 5/26/88.) 
iH/ Finding of Fact No. 61 at p. 17, included in appendix to 
RTC's red brief. 
United Pacific was critical of Judge Baldwin's conduct 
accusing him of entering Findings of Facts which overturned 
the jury verdict. Judge Baldwin took nearly eleven months 
after the jury returned its special verdict attempting to 
reconcile the jury's answers to 52 special interrogatories 
before entering the judgment. His efforts should be 
applauded. He made sense out of inconsistent answers and 
entered judgment exactly as he was supposed to do. See 9 
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, S 2510 
(1971); Garcia v. Salt Lake County, 768 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 
1985). 
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superfluous. Therefore, interrogatory Nos. 22-24 and jury 
instruction No. 18 should be, and in fact are, the focus of Judge 
Jenkins1 certification order. See Certification Order at 8. 
Despite its claim to the contrary, neither United 
Pacific nor Tri-K objected to these special interrogatories or to 
jury instruction No. 1 8 . — T h i s failure in and of itself is 
usually fatal to any post-trial challenge of the jury instruc-
tions. See Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hospital, 184 Ut. Adv. Rep. 
14, 15 (Utah, April 2, 1992); Morgan v. Quailbrook Condominium 
Co., 704 P.2d 573, 579 (Utah 1985). Judge Jenkins has neverthe-
less asked for a clarification of the law. 
11/ When United Pacific's attorney was asked whether he had any 
objections, he answered, "I have no objections then." 
Tri-K's attorney then had an opportunity to object. He 
failed to state any reason why he took exception to instruc-
tion No. 18. His statement was, "We have a waiver instruc-
tion in there, Your Honor. We would have liked that one 
given." His only objection to the form of the special 
interrogatories was that they should simply have asked 
whether there had been a waiver, without going through the 
different elements of proof. No objection was made, how-
ever, that the special interrogatories dealing with waiver 
did not comport with the law. See RT, Objections to Jury 
Interrogatories and Special Verdict, 20:15-22:25, 5/26/88. 
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Ill 
DESERET FEDERAL TRIED TO MITIGATE ITS DAMAGES. 
THIS WAS NOT A WAIVER OF ITS RIGHTS. 
At trial, Deseret Federal elicited testimony from Ron-
ald Frandsen, Major Loan Department Manager for Deseret Federal, 
and David Redd, Deseret Federal's attorney, as well as Sherwin 
Knudsen of Tri-K and Stanley Stoll, attorney for Soters Inc., 
concerning certain workout meetings that took place in February 
and April 1985. It is from these meetings and the events that 
transpired in the spring of 1985, after Tri-K had failed to sub-
stantially complete by December 31, 1984, that United Pacific and 
Tri-K have alleged waiver. There was no evidence, and in fact 
United Pacific and Tri-K have never argued that there was any 
conduct on the part of Deseret Federal prior to December 31, 
which was so inconsistent with an intention to hold Tri-K to its 
completion date, and which mislead Sherwin Knudsen into an honest 
belief that the completion date had been waived. 
Each of these witnesses testified that Deseret Federal 
had made it clear to Greg Soter and Sherwin Knudsen that the bal-
ance of the construction loan was insufficient to complete the 
project and that Tri-K would not be paid beyond December 31, 
1984. It was obvious that the project had not been substantially 
completed on time and no one needed to re-state the obvious. At 
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these meetings, Deseret Federal attempted to mitigate its damages 
and encouraged Knudsen to stay on the job and get the project 
built, Deseret Federal did not, however, relinquish its rights 
under the construction agreement. 
Of the first workout meeting in February 1985, at which 
Stanley Stoll, David Redd, Ron Frandsen, Steven Anderson, Greg 
Soter and Sherwin Knudsen were present, Mr. Stoll testified: 
Q Was anything said in response to that 
about whether or not Sherwin Knudsen 
should continue to work? 
A Yes, both Dave Redd and I agreed, par-
ticularly, that it was in the best 
interest of all concerned to finish the 
project. And therefore whatever mecha-
nism was utilized to work through the 
impasse that existed at that point in 
time, that it was best to keep the peo-
ple on the job. I made the statement, 
particularly to Mr. Redd, that, "Look, 
the project will cost what the project 
is going to cost." That may sound like 
a fair rhetorical statement, but it was 
my point that we had contractors on the 
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job. Mr. Knudsen had just reaffirmed 
and had committed his subcontractors to 
reaffirm. 
RT. 32:24-33:12, 5/12/88. 
Of the second meeting that occurred later in February 
1985, Mr. Stoll testified: 
Q Was there any discussion at this second 
meeting about whether or not Tri-K 
should keep working? 
A I stated again, as I had in the first 
meeting, that it was our position that 
it was in the best interest of all par-
ties to continue constructing the 
project, to complete the project. 
Id. 50:13-18. 
United Pacific stated that during these workout meet-
ings in the spring of 1985, no one ever said that Tri-K was in 
breach of its construction contract. United Pacific failed to 
point out that no one from Deseret Federal ever said that Deseret 
Federal did not expect Tri-K to adhere to its completion date, or 
that Deseret Federal was waiving its rights under the construc-
tion agreement to have the project completed by December 31, 
1984. These facts bear on whether the jury could as easily have 
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been looking for an expression of waiver by silence as waiver by 
words or action. See Testimony of Ronald Frandsen, RT. 
156:14-158:11, 5/19/88; testimony of Stanley Stoll, RT. 
26:12-34:22, 5/12/88. 
The testimony of Soters* attorney Stan Stoll, and Ron 
Frandsen of Deseret Federal, puts the workout meetings into their 
proper context. The purpose of the 1985 meetings between Deseret 
Federal, Sherwin Knudsen, Greg Soter and their attorneys was to 
confront Greg Soter and Knudsen with the problem that the loan 
was out of balance and the project was not finished. Greg Soter 
was told that if he didn't put money into the pot to bring the 
loan back into balance, Deseret Federal would not make any fur-
ther loan disbursements. Knudsen admitted at trial that he was 
fully aware of the situation and of Deseret Federal's position. 
Testimony of Sherwin Knudsen, RT. 77, 5/16/88. 
Furthermore, Stan Stollfs testimony points to the 
efforts Deseret Federal was taking in the spring of 1985 to try 
and work out the problems with Greg Soter and Sherwin Knudsen. 
This effort to mitigate its damages is obviously the "other 
intent" that the jury was referring to when it answered special 
interrogatory No. 24. See Testimony of Stanley Stoll, RT. 
25:20-34:22, 5/12/88. 
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After it became apparent that any further efforts to 
mitigate were useless, Deseret Federal gave written notice to 
United Pacific, in June 1985, of its obligation to step in and 
complete the project. Trial Exhibit 91. United Pacific elected 
to completely ignore the demand and by the time this case went to 
trial the unfinished condominiums had spent three winters deteri-
orating under the elements. Testimony of Ronald Frandsen, RT. 
160:8-161:6, 5/19/88. 
United Pacific and Tri-K referred to the trial testi-
mony of a Deseret Federal employee, Steven Anderson, who testi-
fied that he knew in September 1984, that the project would not 
be completed until the end of 1985. See RT. 112, 5/19/88. This 
testimony about Mr. Anderson's belief in 1984 cannot support 
United Pacific's contention that in the spring of 1985 Deseret 
Federal unequivocally expressed an intention to relinquish its 
right to a timely completion of the condominiums. Perhaps more 
importantly, there was no evidence that Mr. Anderson's belief 
mislead Knudsen to believe that the completion date had been 
waived. 
In fact, it appeared that Steven Anderson made a typo-
graphical error on the September 1984 Loan Disbursement Authori-
zation and typed the project completion date as 12-85, meaning 
December 1985, instead of the correct date of 12-84, that he 
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later typed on the subsequent October 1984 Loan Disbursement 
Authorization form. When Anderson took the stand at trial, he 
tried to cover his blunder by claiming the project was not to be 
completed until somewhere around year end of 1985 or before, 
Anderson testified he discussed this with Ron Frandsen, Major 
Loan Department Manager for Deseret Federal. When Frandsen took 
the stand, however, he testified that he met with Greg Soter, 
Sherwin Knudsen, Soters' attorney Stanley Stoll, and Steve 
Anderson at attorney David Redd's office in February 1985, and 
that there was a discussion as to whether the project was on 
schedule. Frandsen was concerned because Soters and Tri-K were 
missing the prime marketing season and the project was not com-
pleted as required by the contract. At that time, Frandsen 
learned for the first time that Knudsen expected a fall 1985 com-
pletion. Testimony of Ronald Frandsen, RT. 156:14-159:17, 
5/19/88. 
United Pacific and Tri-K inferred that because Deseret 
Federal paid Tri-K in February 1985, for its December 1984 draw 
request, that this was a manifestation of Deseret Federal's 
waiver of the December 31, 1984 completion date. This argument 
is entirely disingenuous in view of United Pacific's attorney's 
statement to the jury that payment for the December work was a 
-21-
condition precedent to enforcement of its bond. RT. Opening 
Statements 27:19-28:11, 5/11/88. 
CONCLUSION 
The focus of the briefing and eventual argument before 
this Court should be on the questions posed by Judge Jenkins in 
his certification order. When these questions are answered and 
the points he has raised are clarified, Judge Jenkins can then 
rule on the parties' motions for post trial relief. 
The RTC urges the Court to adopt the analysis of the 
law of waiver set out in its opening brief. It is undisputed 
that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right 
and that the relinquishment may be express or implied. Because 
the "intent" of the party holding the right is the core of this 
legal principle, the required proof of the expression of that 
intent which is set out in Hunter v. Hunter is correct. Any 
lesser standard improperly shifts the focus from the intent of 
the party holding the right to the perceptions of others around 
him. The importance of asking the "inconsistent with any other 
intent" question was illustrated by Morgan v. Quailbrook Condo-
minium Company, 704 P.2d 573 (Utah 1985). Moreover, no lesser 
standard should apply to cases involving waiver by silence. Rees 
v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1991). 
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